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Abstract
This study examines the steady-state growth e®ect of in°ation in an endogenous
growth model in which Calvo-type nominal rigidity with endogenous contract du-
ration and monetary friction via wage-payment-in-advance constraint are assumed.
On the balanced-growth path in this model, the marginal growth e®ect of in°a-
tion is weakly negative or even positive at low in°ation rates because the e®ect on
average markup o®sets the negative marginal growth e®ect through the monetary
friction, but the growth e®ect of in°ation is negative and convex at higher in°ation
rates because the frequency of price adjustment approaches that of the °exible-
price economy and the growth e®ect through the nominal rigidity is dominated
by the growth e®ect through the monetary friction. With a plausible calibration
of the structural parameters, this model generates a relationship between in°ation
and growth that is consistent with empirical evidence, particularly in industrial
countries.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies have found that the relationship between in°ation and growth
is non-linear.1 The stylized facts are as follows. First, there is a threshold in°ation
rate above which the marginal e®ect of in°ation on growth is negative and below which
the one is nonsigni¯cant or even positive. Second, above the threshold in°ation rate,
the relationship between in°ation and growth is convex in the sence that the negative
marginal e®ect is weaker when in°ation is high.
On the other hand, most theoretical studies fail to generate this non-linear relation-
ship. For example, in °exible-price monetary endogenous growth models with cash-in-
advance constraint, the marginal growth e®ect of in°ation is always negative, as surveyed
in Gillman and Kejak (2005). In monetary endogenous growth models with prototypical
Calvo-type nominal rigidity, as in Funk and Kromen (2006) and Kuwahara and Sudo
(2007), there is a threshold in°ation rate but above it the relationship is concave.
In this paper we show that, with a plausible calibration of the structural parameters,
a monetary endogenous growth model with a Calvo-type staggered price setting with
endogenous contract duration, as in Levin and Yun (2007), can generate the non-linear
relationship consistent across a wide range of in°ation with the empirical evidence for
industrial countries. In this model, there is a threshold in°ation rate below which the
marginal e®ect of in°ation on growth is weakly negative or even positive, because at low
in°ation rates steady-state in°ation a®ects average markup through the nominal rigidity,
which o®sets the negative marginal growth e®ect through the monetary friction. However,
when in°ation is high, nominal rigidity becomes weaker and the situation approaches that
of °exible-price economy; hence the marginal e®ect becomes negative and the in°ation-
growth relationship is convex. In our numerical result, the threshold in°ation rate is
about 0.1%, which is consistent with the empirical evidence in Khan and Senhadji (2001)
that this rate is below 1% for ¯ve-year averaged data in industrial countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section
3 shows the mechanisms and the numerical results of the growth e®ect in the °exible-price
economy, in the prototypical Calvo-type sticky-price economy, and in the Calvo economy
with endogenous contract duration. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2 The Model
The model considered in this study is a simple two-capital endogenous growth model in
which monetary friction via wage-payment-in-advance constraint of ¯rms is introduced.
Time is discrete. There are three types of agents in this economy: the representative
household, monopolistically competitive ¯rms, and the monetary authority. For simplic-
ity, ¯scal policy is ignored.
1See Section 1 in Hung (2008).
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The representative household maximizes the following discounted sum of utility2:
1X
t=0
¯tflogCt + Ã log[(1¡ nt)Ht]g; (1)
where C denotes aggregate consumption, n 2 (0; 1) denotes hours worked, H denotes
human capital stock, and Ã > 0 and ¯ 2 (0; 1) are exogenous parameters. The intertem-
poral budget constraint is as follows:
Bt
Pt
+ Ct +Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±k)Kt +Ht+1 ¡ (1¡ ±H)Ht
=
it¡1Bt¡1
Pt
+ wtntHt + r
K
t Kt + ©t; (2)
where B denotes the quantity of a nominal ¯nancial asset that earns the gross nominal
interest rate i, K denotes physical capital stock, ¼ denotes gross rate of in°ation, w
denotes real wage rate, rK denotes real gross rate of return on physical capital, © denotes
real dividend income from ¯rms they own, ±K is an exogenous parameter representing
the depreciation rate of physical capital, and ±H is an exogenous parameter representing
the depreciation rate of human capital.
Each individual ¯rm j (2 [0; 1]) monopolistically supplies the variety j, using a Cobb-
Douglas production technology:
Yt(j) = AKt(j)
®Zt(j)
1¡®; (3)
where A and ® denote exogenous parameters representing aggregate productivity and
capital share respectively, and where K(j) and Z(j) denote the demand for physical
capital and for e®ective labor respectively, each of which must satisfy the resource con-
straints,
R 1
0
Kt(j)di = Kt and
R 1
0
Zt(j)di = ntHt. It is assumed that workers must be paid
their wage bill by cash in advance of production. Hence ¯rm j borrows its nominal wage
payment, PtwtZt(j), from a ¯nancial intermediary at the beginning of period t. Repay-
ment occurs at the end of period t at the gross nominal interest rate it. Consequently, the
total real production cost of ¯rm j is rKt Kt(j)+ itwtZt(j). From the ¯rst-order conditions
of cost minimization with respect to Kt(j) and Zt(j), it holds that r
K
t =
®A

Kt
ntHt
®¡1
¹t
and
wt =
(1¡®)A

Kt
ntHt
®
it¹t
, where ¹ denotes average markup, which is de¯ned as the reciprocal
of the real marginal cost (the Lagrange multiplier with respect to (3)).
2To keep the model tractable, we assume log utility and quality time of leisure. Our ¯nal result is
robust even if the instantaneous utility function is assumed to be in the CRRA form, C
1¡¾
t [(1¡nt)Ht]Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾
or to depend on raw time of leisure, C
1¡¾
t (1¡nt)Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾ , though its mechanism becomes more complicated.
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The aggregate demand index Y is assembled using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, Yt =³R 1
0
Yt(j)
µ¡1
µ di
´ µ
µ¡1
, where µ > 1 denotes the parameter representing the elasticity of
substitution. Hence ¯rm j faces a downward-sloping demand function:
Yt(j) =
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶¡µ
Yt; (4)
where P (j) denotes the price of variety j and the aggregate price level P is de¯ned as
Pt =
³R 1
0
Pt(j)
1¡µdi
´ 1
1¡µ
: Each ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t by optimally setting its price
subject to (4). The details will be described later.
At the beginning of period t, ¯nancial intermediaries have nominal money balances
Pt¡1Mt¡1 and receive a monetary transfer PtMt¡Pt¡1Mt¡1 from the monetary authority,
where M denotes real money balances, and lend all their money to ¯rms for their wage
payments
R 1
0
PtwtZt(j)di. Hence the loan market clearing condition is Mt = wtntHt.
The aggregate demand consists of aggregate consumption, aggregate physical capital
investment, aggregate human capital investment, and aggregate menu cost3: hence,
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±K)Kt +Ht+1 ¡ (1¡ ±H)Ht + (1¡ »)­t: (5)
The monetary authority sets the in°ation rate f¼tg.4
3 Growth E®ect of In°ation
Given ¹ and i, the steady-state growth rate of output ° is determined by:
° = ¯r; (Euler equation) (6)
r =
®A
¡
K
nH
¢®¡1
¹
+ 1¡ ±K ; (No-arbitrage condition) (7)
r =
(1¡ ®)A ¡ K
nH
¢®
i¹
+ 1¡ ±H : (No-arbitrage condition) (8)
Equation (6) implies that households' saving behavior determines the growth rate of
output, depending only on the real rate of interest, r. Equations (7) and (8) imply that
arbitrage between physical capital, human capital, and ¯nancial assets determines the
physical-capital-to-e®ective-labor ratio and real rate of interest for a given ¹ and i5; hence
3The ¯nal term of RHS in (5) denotes aggregate menu cost. The datails are described later.
4This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the monetary authority sets nominal interest rate
fitg or money growth rate f´tg ´ f PtMtPt¡1Mt¡1 g. The stability of the equilibrium depends on the monetary
policy rule, but we ignore the details of the rule because in this paper we focus on the steady state.
5Note that real rate of interest depends only on KnH because we assume quality time for utility from
leisure. If it is assumed that utility from leisure depends only on raw time, 1¡nt, then the determination
of the real interest rate becomes more complicated. However, our main results is numerically robust.
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in°ation has a growth e®ect if in°ation a®ects the real rate of interest through a change
in the nominal rate of interest and/or average markup. In the following subsections, we
consider a) the °exible-price economy in order to see the growth e®ect through changes
in the nominal rate of interest, and b) the sticky-price economy in order to see the e®ect
through changes in average markup.
3.1 Flexible-price Economy
Let us consider the °exible-price economy, in which in°ation a®ects the real rate of interest
only through the change of the nominal interest rate because steady-state average markup
is constant, ¹ = µ
µ¡1 . The reason why the nominal rate of interest a®ects the real rate
of interest is because there exists a monetary friction according to the wage-payment-in-
advance assumption. We refer to this growth e®ect of in°ation as a nominal interest rate
e®ect. The relationship between in°ation rate and real and nominal rate of interest is
described by the Fisher equation:
i = r¼: (Fisher equation) (9)
Substituting (9) into (8), it holds that:
r =
1
2
Ã
1¡ ±H +
s
(1¡ ±H)2 + 4
¼¹
(1¡ ®)A
µ
K
nH
¶®!
: (10)
Given ¼, equations (7) and (10) determine real rate of interest. Figure 1 illustrates
the determination of the real interest rate. When ¼ rises, (10) shifts downward and r
falls. Therefore, the marginal nominal interest rate e®ect of in°ation on growth rate is
necessarily negative as in standard monetary endogenous growth models.6
3.2 Sticky-price Economy with Exogenous Contract Duration
In this subsection we consider the sticky-price economy with exogenous contract duration
(the prototypical Calvo model), in which each ¯rm can reset its price with the probability
1¡ » and in which » is constant. In this economy, in°ation has an e®ect on real interest
rate and growth, since the existence of nominal rigidity causes an in°ationary e®ect on
average markup, in addition to its nominal interest rate e®ect. We refer to the e®ect on
average markup as the markup e®ect. As illustrated in Figure 2, a rise of ¹ makes r fall
6This monetary friction works similarly to the cash-in-advance constraint in standard monetary en-
dogenous growth models. In our model, the cash-in-advance constraint of households does not a®ect
growth because cash-in-advance constraint a®ects only hours worked, n. If we assume that utility from
leisure depends only on raw time, the cash-in-advance constraint has the same growth e®ect as in stan-
dard monetary endogenous growth models.
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because (7) and (10) shift downward. Therefore, a rise (fall) of average markup gives rise
to a fall (rise) of growth rate of output.
In this economy, for a given ¼, the economy-wide average markup ¹ is determined by
the optimal pricing behavior of ¯rms and the price level equation as follows:7
~¹ =
µ
µ ¡ 1
1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1
1¡ ¯»¼µ ; (Optimal pricing behavior) (11)
¹1¡µ = »
³¹
¼
´1¡µ
+ (1¡ »)~¹1¡µ; (Price level equation) (12)
where ~¹ ´ ~P
P
¹ denotes the optimal markup set by ¯rms that can reset their prices. From
these equations, average markup is described as:
¹ =
µ
µ ¡ 1
1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1
1¡ ¯»¼µ
µ
1¡ »¼µ¡1
1¡ »
¶ 1
µ¡1
; (13)
hence average markup depends only on in°ation rate.8 As shown in Panel C of Figure
3, the relationship between in°ation and average markup is U-shaped.9 The intuition of
the U-shaped average markup is as follows. Equation (12) implies that the economy-wide
average markup ¹ depends on both the average markup of ¯rms that cannot reset their
nominal prices ¹=¼ and the markup of ¯rms that can reset their nominal prices ~¹. On
the one hand, ¹=¼ is decreasing in ¼ for a given ¹. This is because the average relative
price of ¯rms that cannot reset their nominal prices falls at that in°ation rate, but real
marginal cost is constant on a balanced-growth path. On the other hand, from (11), we
see that ~¹ is increasing in ¼. The reason is that when the in°ation rate is high, ¯rms that
can reset their nominal prices set their markup higher because they are concerned with
the possibility that their markup would keep declining in the future when they cannot
reset their prices. Because of these two opposing e®ects, in°ation has a U-shaped impact
on economy-wide average markup.
Since a rise of average markup brings a fall of real interest rate and growth, the
marginal markup e®ect on growth is positive at low in°ation rates and negative at high
in°ation rates. Figure 3 shows the numerical result of this relationship for various values
of ».10 We can see that the U-shaped average markup becomes °atter as » decreases
7The derivation of (11) and (12) is in Appendix A.
8Our assumption of log utility simpli¯es the analysis. If instantaneous utility has a more general
form, C
1¡¾
t [(1¡nt)Ht]Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾ , then average markup depends not only on in°ation but also on the growth
rate of output; hence the mechanism becomes more complicated. However, even in this case, our results
are robust.
9This U-shaped relationship follows if ¯ is su±ciently near 1. The analytical proof is in Appendix B.
10The values of the structural parameters are in Table 1 and the calibration strategy is
in Appendix C. The Matlab programs for our numerical analysis are on the author's website
(http://sites.google.com/site/hirokiarato/).
5
and that the markup e®ect disappears when » = 0. This is because the decrease of »
means that nominal rigidity becomes weaker and the situation approaches that of the
°exible-price economy. When » is su±ciently high, there is a threshold in°ation rate
below which the marginal growth e®ect is positive because the markup e®ect o®sets the
nominal interest rate e®ect. However, this relationship is concave in the whole range of
in°ation, which is inconsistent with empirical evidence at high in°ation rates.11
3.3 Sticky-price Economy with Endogenous Contract Duration
Finally, we consider the Calvo model with endogenous contract duration as in Levin and
Yun (2007). In this model, each ¯rm is allowed to choose not only its price but also its
average contract duration (or the probability of changing its price). For simplicity, we
assume that the economy is on a balanced-growth path.12 In each period, ¯rm j can reset
the nominal price of its variety with probability 1 ¡ »(j). Moreover, ¯rms must pay a
¯xed menu cost ­t ´ !Yt when they can change their prices. Given these assumptions,
each ¯rm maximizes the expected present-value of its current and future pro¯ts subject
to the demand function (4), choosing its price and the probability of changing its price.
Following Levin and Yun (2007), we restrict our analysis to a symmetric Nash equilibrium
in which all ¯rms choose the same probability of changing prices; hence »(j) = » for all
j. In this economy, » and ¹ are determined according to (11), (12), and the optimal
condition with respect to the contract duration of ¯rms, which is described as:
~¹1¡µ(¼µ¡1 ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1)2 =
~¹¡µ(¼µ ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¼µ)2 ¡ !¹
1¡µ; (Optimal contract duration) (14)
when the internal solution exists.13 By allowing ¯rms to choose the frequency of changing
prices, ¯rms change their price more frequently as in°ation deviates from zero, as shown
in Panel D of Figure 4. The reason for this relationship is the existence of ¯xed menu cost.
If in°ation is near zero, the loss of pro¯t by unchanging their prices is small because the
di®erence between price-unchanging ¯rms' markup and the optimal one is small. Hence,
concerned by ¯xed menu cost, ¯rms choose a low frequency of price changing. As in°ation
deviates from zero, the loss of pro¯t by unchanging their prices becomes larger; hence
¯rms choose a higher frequency even if they must pay the menu cost more frequently.
If in°ation is extremely high, all ¯rms change their prices in every period; hence the
situation is the same as that of the °exible-price economy.
11Moreover, this model can analyze the growth e®ect only at moderate in°ation. This model has an
equilibrium only if »¼µ¡1 < 1 and »¼µ < 1 because the average markup ¹ and the degree of relative price
dispersion s must be positive and ¯nite (see eq.(12) and eq.(38) in Appendix C).
12For the ¯rm's behavior in a stochastic economy, see the working paper version of Levin and Yun
(2007).
13The derivation of (14) is in Appendix A.
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Varying the frequency of changing prices makes the markup e®ect more complex. In
addition to the U-shaped markup e®ect in the previous subsection, there is the e®ect
that this U-shaped relationship becomes °atter as in°ation deviates from zero. Figures
4 and 5 indicate the numerical result, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.
First, there is a threshold in°ation rate of about 0.1% in a year at which the marginal
growth e®ect changes from positive to negative. Readers may question why at severe
de°ation (below minus 0.1% in year) the marginal e®ect is negative. We think that the
reason for the positive or nonsigni¯cant marginal e®ect of growth in empirical studies
is the infrequency in the number of observations of severe de°ation. Since most of the
observations below the threshold in°ation rate are distributed around zero in°ation, the
regression analysis would show an upward-sloping or nonsigni¯cant relationship between
in°ation and growth. Second, above the threshold in°ation rate, the relationship between
in°ation and growth is decreasing and convex because the markup e®ect is weaker when
in°ation is high and the situation approaches the °exible-price economy in which only
the nominal interest rate e®ect a®ects growth. As a result, this economy can generate the
plausible in°ation-growth relationship in a wider range of in°ation than the sticky-price
economy with exogenous contract duration. Third, our model can be calibrated more
accurately than the endogenous growth models with the imperfect information in credit
market, in which Bose (2002) and Hung (2008) show the existence of a threshold in°ation
rate. With our calibration of the structural parameters, the threshold in°ation rate is
about 0.1%. In the empirical study in Khan and Senhadji (2001), the threshold in°ation
rate is below 1% in industrial countries and 11% in developed countries for ¯ve-year
averaged data. With this empirical evidence, we conclude that our model can generate
the plausible threshold in°ation rate in industrial countries.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that the monetary endogenous growth model with Calvo-type nom-
inal rigidity with endogenous contract duration can generate the plausible relationship
between in°ation and growth, especially in industrial countries. However, there are some
open questions in our analysis. First, our model suggests the existence of a lower alter-
native threshold in°ation rate below which the marginal growth e®ect becomes negative.
This hypothesis is potentially testable. If we had more observations of de°ation, we could
test the existence of the alternative threshold in°ation rate by dividing the low-in°ation
observations into two subsamples. Second, our model can not replicate the plausible
threshold in°ation rate in developing countries, which is shown to be 11% for ¯ve-year
averaged data in Khan and Senhadji (2001). This result suggests that the analysis for
developing countries needs some alternative assumptions of, for example, imperfect infor-
mation in credit market as in Bose (2002) and in Hung (2008). However, the measurement
of the degree of imperfect information is di±cult. In order to analyze the growth e®ect of
in°ation in developing countries quantitatively, we must obtain more empirical evidence
7
about market structure and imperfect information.
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Appendix
A. Derivation of (11), (12), and (14)
In the prototypical Calvo model, ¯rms that can reset their price at time t choose their
steady-state relative price ~p ´ ~Pt=Pt, which is constant, to maximize the discounted sum
of their expected pro¯t until they reset their prices,
©t(~p; ») =
1X
s=0
µ
»
r
¶s "µ
~p
¼s
¶1¡µ
Yt+s ¡
µ
~p
¼s
¶¡µ
Yt+s
¹
#
= Yt
1X
s=0
µ
»°
r
¶s "µ
~p
¼s
¶1¡µ
¡
µ
~p
¼s
¶¡µ
1
¹
#
(15)
on a balanced-growth path. The ¯rst-order condition is described as:
1X
s=0
µ
»°
r
¶s ·
¼sµ ¡ µ ¡ 1
µ
(¹~p)¼s(µ¡1)
¸
= 0; (16)
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Using the Fisher equation ° = ¯r and the de¯nition of optimal markup ~¹ = ¹~p,
1X
s=0
(¯»)s
µ
¼sµ ¡ µ ¡ 1
µ
~¹¼s(µ¡1)
¶
= 0: (17)
After some calculation, we obtain (11).
See the aggregate price level equation,
Pt =
µZ 1
0
Pt(j)
1¡µdi
¶ 1
1¡µ
: (18)
When the probability that each ¯rm can reset their prices is 1¡ », (18) can be rewritten
as:
P 1¡µt = »P
1¡µ
t¡1 + (1¡ ») ~P 1¡µt : (19)
Dividing (Pt
¹
)1¡µ into this equation, we can see that (12) holds on a balanced growth
path.
Next consider the Calvo model with endogenous contract duration. Assume that ¯rm
j can change its price at time t. If it sets its relative price to be ~p(j), then the discounted
sum of expected pro¯t until it resets its price is ©t(~p(j); »(j))¡!Yt. Therefore, the total
discounted sum of its pro¯t Vt(~p(j); »(j)) is:
Vt(~p(j); »(j)) = (©t(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt) + 1¡ »(j)
r
(©t+1(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt+1)
+
1¡ »(j)
r2
(©t+2(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt+2) + ¢ ¢ ¢ (20)
Hence, Vt(~p(j); »(j)) can be rewritten as:
Vt(~p(j); »(j)) = YtÁ(~p(j); »(j))
·
1 + (1¡ »(j))°
r
+ (1¡ »(j))
³°
r
´2
+ ¢ ¢ ¢
¸
= YtÁ(~p(j); »(j))
£
1 + (1¡ »(j))¯ + (1¡ »(j))¯2 + ¢ ¢ ¢ ¤
= YtÁ(~p(j); »(j))
1¡ ¯»(j)
1¡ ¯ ; (21)
where,
Á(~p(j); »(j)) ´ ©t(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt
Yt
=
( 1X
s=0
µ
»(j)°
r
¶s "µ
~p(j)
¼s
¶1¡µ
¡
µ
~p(j)
¼s
¶¡µ
1
¹
#)
¡ !; (22)
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which is constant on balanced-growth path.
The pro¯t maximization problem of ¯rm j has two steps. First, given »(j), ¯rm j
chooses its optimal relative price ~p¤(»(j)). Hence,
~p¤(»(j)) = argmax
~p(j)
Vt(~p(j); »(j))
= argmax
~p(j)
Á(~p(j); »(j)): (23)
We can solve this problem as in the prototypical Calvo model and obtain:
~¹(»(j)) =
µ
µ ¡ 1
1¡ ¯»(j)¼µ¡1
1¡ ¯»(j)¼µ : (24)
Second, given », ¯rm j chooses its optimal frequency of changing price 1 ¡ »¤(j).
Hence,
»¤(j) = argmax
»(j)
´t(»(j)); (25)
where,
´t(»(j)) ´ Vt(~p¤(»(j)); »(j)): (26)
By the envelope theorem, the ¯rst-order condition is
d´t
d»(j)
=
@Vt
@»(j)
= 0: (27)
By (21), the ¯rst-order condition can be written as:
@
@»(j)
·
Á(~p¤; »(j))
1¡ ¯»(j)
1¡ ¯
¸
= 0: (28)
Some calculations arrange it as:
~¹1¡µ(¼µ¡1 ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¤(j)¼µ¡1)2 =
~¹¡µ(¼µ ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¤(j)¼µ)2 ¡ !¹
1¡µ: (29)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, »¤(j) = », for all j. Therefore, we obtain (11) and (14)
from (24) and (29), respectively.
B. Proof of U-shaped average markup in exogenous contract duration model
Here we prove that if ¯ is su±ciently near 1, there is an in°ation rate ¼¤ 2 (1;minf 1
¯
; »¡
1
µ g)
such that @¹
@¼
S 0 if ¼ S ¼¤.
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From (13), it follows that
@¹
@¼
=
µ
µ ¡ 1(1¡ »)
1
µ¡1
(1¡ »¼µ¡1) 1µ¡1¡1
(1¡ ¯»¼µ)2 »¼
µ¡2f(¼); (30)
where
f(¼) ´ µ¯(1¡ »¼µ¡1)(¼ ¡ 1)¡ (1¡ ¯»¼µ)(1¡ ¯): (31)
The sign of @¹
@¼
is identical to the f(¼)'s one because there are restrictions that 1¡»¼µ > 0
and 1¡ »¼µ¡1 > 0. Di®erentiating f(¼), we obtain
f 0(¼) = µ¯[1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1 ¡ (µ ¡ 1)(¼ ¡ 1)»¼µ¡2]; (32)
hence, f 0(¼) > 0 if ¼ · 1 and f 0(¼) is decreasing if ¼ ¸ 1. Here we see that
f(1) = ¡(1¡ ¯»)(1¡ ¯) < 0; (33)
f(
1
¯
) = (µ ¡ 1)(1¡ ¯)(1¡ »¯1¡µ) > 0: (34)
and if ¯ is su±ciently near 1,
lim
¼!»¡µ¡0
f(¼) = ¡¯2 + [2 + µ(»¡ 1µ + » 1µ ¡ 2)]¯ ¡ 1 > 0: (35)
Therefore, there is a unique ¼¤ 2 (1;minf 1
¯
; »¡
1
µ g) such that f(¼) S 0 if ¼ S ¼¤.
C. Calibration
In order to calibrate our model, in addition to the equilibrium conditions that have
already been derived, that is, the Euler equation (6), the no-arbitrage conditions (7) and
(8), the Fisher equation (9), the optimal pricing equation (11), the price level equation
(12), and the optimal contract duration equation (14), other conditions are needed. First,
the optimal labor supply equation,
Ã
1¡ n
C
H
=
(1¡ ®)A( K
nH
)®
i¹
: (36)
Second, the aggregate good market clearing condition,
A(K
H
)®n1¡®
s
=
C
H
+ (° ¡ 1 + ±K)KH + (° ¡ 1 + ±H)
1¡ (1¡ »)! ; (37)
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where s ´ R 1
0
(Pt(j)
Pt
)¡µdj ¸ 1 denotes the degree of relative price dispersion, which is
described as:
s = (1¡ ») 11¡µ (1¡ »¼
µ¡1)
µ
µ¡1
1¡ »¼µ : (38)
The time unit is assumed to be one quarter. ®, ±H , ±K , !, and µ are set to the values
used in growth and business cycle literature. A, ¯, and Ã are set such that the annual real
interest rate is 3% and that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is unity (hence n = 0:5)
at the steady state with ¼ = 1:0421=4 and ° = 1:0045. The values of the structural
parameters are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Structural parameters
A ® ¯ ±H ±K ! Ã µ
0.0445 0.36 1:0045=1:031=4 0.005 0.025 0.029 807.4 4.33
Figure 1: Nominal interest rate e®ect (when ¼ increases)
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Figure 2: Markup e®ect (when ¹ increases)
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Figure 3: E®ects of in°ation in the exogenous contract duration model
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Note: Solid line when » = 0:9, broken line when » = 0:85, dash{dotted line when » = 0:7,
dotted line when » = 0 (°exible-price economy).
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Figure 4: E®ects of in°ation in the endogenous contract duration model
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Figure 5: E®ects of in°ation in the endogenous contract duration model (around zero
in°ation)
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